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2008年02 期
| 標(biāo)題 |
| 基于博弈論的逆向供應(yīng)鏈EPR實(shí)施模式研究(30 卷) |
| 英文標(biāo)題 |
| Study on the EPR Application Pattern for the Reverse Supply Chain Based on the Game Theory |
| 摘要 |
| EPR實(shí)施模式是EPR運(yùn)作機(jī)制和整個(gè)逆向供應(yīng)鏈的基礎(chǔ)。基于博弈論研究認(rèn)為，廢舊產(chǎn)品規(guī)范回收面臨著公共資源悲劇。理論上分析，雖通過(guò)引入懲罰機(jī)制可以弱化這一悲劇，但監(jiān)督博弈分析證實(shí)，該機(jī)制在實(shí)踐中并不可行。同時(shí)，公共資源悲劇理論也表明國(guó)外EPR的3種實(shí)施模式在國(guó)內(nèi)難以 |
| 作者 |
| 新聞作者:吳 剛，陳蘭芳，游宗君，王煜洲 |
| 關(guān)鍵字 |
